<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	>

<channel>
	<title>ICTSD &#187; Systemic Issues</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.ictsd.org/go/systemicissues/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://ictsd.org</link>
	<description>International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development</description>
	<pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2012 13:28:36 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.6</generator>
	<language>en</language>
			<item>
		<title>WTO Dispute Settlement - Meeting Domestic&#160;Challenges</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/101706/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/101706/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2011 16:39:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>interns</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[DSU Review Documents]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Developing countries and the WTO]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dialogue]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement Understanding]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Documents of interest]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Domestic Regulation]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Activities]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[International Trade Agreements]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Legal Instruments]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[National]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Trade Facilitation]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Trade Rules and Competitiveness]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[WTO]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[WTO Agreements]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[WTO Cases]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[WTO Services Rules Negotiations]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=101706</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In fifteen years of dispute settlement the WTO has seen over 400 cases, whereof forty percent have been initiated by developing countries. In fact, some developing countries have become confident users of the system and currently seven out of the eleven most frequent complainants are developing countries. The majority, however, continue to be hampered in [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In fifteen years of dispute settlement the WTO has seen over 400 cases, whereof forty percent have been initiated by developing countries. In fact, some developing countries have become confident users of the system and currently seven out of the eleven most frequent complainants are developing countries. The majority, however, continue to be hampered in making use of the system as they face structural and systemic challenges. In particular, the importance of ‘national legal capacity’, including the existence of structures that facilitate the coordination among public and private stakeholders is often underestimated. Against this backdrop there is a great need for generating analysis on the various country experiences to inform activities aimed at strengthening legal capacity in developing countries.</p>
<p>In response to this need, ICTSD has engaged in a bottom-up assessment of the strategies that individual developing countries have developed to enhance their ability to make use of WTO dispute settlement and to coordinate such activities among public and private stakeholders on a national level. The outcome is the form of nine country studies is now presented in the book Dispute Settlement at the WTO – The Developing Country Experience. Countries covered in the analysis include Brazil, Argentina, China, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Egypt, South Africa and Kenya. The publication concludes with a comprehensive list of recommendations. For further information kindly consult our webpage at: <a href="http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/98179/">http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/98179/</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/101706/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts: The Case of Environmental Agreements, Free Trade Agreements and the&#160;WTO</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/93156/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/93156/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Nov 2010 13:41:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>gpascolini</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[EPAs and Regionalism Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Environment and Natural Resources Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Issue paper]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=93156</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[With an ever increasing number of international agreements addressing a wide range of issues, clashes between such agreements and international courts have become more likely if not avoidable. Whether it concerns the relation of labour law and competitiveness, climate change mitigation and tariffs on environmental goods and services, the protection of the sea and maritime [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With an ever increasing number of international agreements addressing a wide range of issues, clashes between such agreements and international courts have become more likely if not avoidable. Whether it concerns the relation of labour law and competitiveness, climate change mitigation and tariffs on environmental goods and services, the protection of the sea and maritime transportation, or biodiversity conservation and the green economy - trade law and with it the WTO touches upon a myriad of areas regulated by international agreements other than the WTO.</p>
<p>Professor Pieter Jan Kuijper from Amsterdam University explores this relation in his recent study &#8220;Conflicting Rules and Clashing Courts: The Case of Environmental Agreements, Free Trade Agreements and the WTO&#8221; published by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). In this paper, the tool kit available under international law to solve such disputes is discussed through a large number of references to exiting or potential cases.<br />
Professor Kuijper concludes his paper with a list of concrete recommendations to negotiators, litigators, courts and countries. Amongst others, he proposes increased attention on the principle of mutual supportiveness - an wording found in an increasing number of environmental agreements. Moreover, he makes some concrete observations on so called &#8220;fork-in-the-road provisions&#8221; in free trade agreements and develops recommendations for the inter-regime coordination of international tribunals and the application of comity or litispendence in international courts:</p>
<p>&#8220;The application of WTO law may require that the interpretative principle of mutual supportiveness is applied to the relevant WTO rules, which does not imply non-application of WTO law, but application in a restrained way that would not harm the object and purpose of the WTO Agreements.&#8221;</p>
<p>&#8220;In the interest of the stability of international rule making and governance, international courts and tribunals in neighboring fields, like trade, investment, the environment etc. need to develop a doctrine of &#8220;forum non conveniens&#8221; between themselves, or at the very least use their inherent powers to abstain from exercising jurisdiction or rule on admissibility if there are serious reasons to do so.&#8221;</p>
<p>Please access the study here.<br />
The study will also be presenting during ICTSD&#8217;s upcoming event on &#8220;Coherence and Compliance: MEAs, FTAs and the WTO&#8221; on 12 November, 2010 at 12:30 at the WTO Room A. Please enter the event web page <a href="http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/93293/">here</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/93156/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Questions Juridiques et  Systémiques Dans les Accords  de Partenariat économique: Quelle voie suivre à&#160;présent?</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/91636/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/91636/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Oct 2010 14:02:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Maximiliano Chab</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[EPAs]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[EPAs and Regionalism Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[EU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[RTAs]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=91636</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[L’étude du Dr. Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, intitulé « Questions juridiques et systémiques dans les Accords de partenariat économique: Quelle voie suivre à présent? » propose une analyse légale de certaines questions clés sur la relation entre l’OMC et les APE. Voici quelques une de ces questions :

L’application de la clause de la nation la [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>L’étude du Dr. Cosmas Milton Obote Ochieng, intitulé « Questions juridiques et systémiques dans les Accords de partenariat économique: Quelle voie suivre à présent? » propose une analyse légale de certaines questions clés sur la relation entre l’OMC et les APE. Voici quelques une de ces questions :</p>
<ul>
<li>L’application de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, l’article XXIV du GATT et son lien avec les APE</li>
<li>Les effets de la clause de statu quo sur les taux tarifaires appliqués aux pays  ACP par les membres de l’OMC.</li>
<li>Les effets politiques et juridiques de la clause de non exécuti on dans les APE.</li>
<li>L’articulation des mécanismes de règlements de différends de l’APE et de leurs interactions avec celui de l’OMC.</li>
</ul>
<p>Le document se termine par une série de recommandations d’ordre juridique qui pourraient être utiles à tous les intervenants dans la compréhension des enjeux des négociations des APE.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/91636/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Post-Doha Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries: Identifying and Addressing the Need for Improved Extra-Legal DSU&#160;Support</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/11396/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/11396/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jun 2008 10:08:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement Understanding]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Events]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Dialogues]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=11396</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU: Identifying Problems, Offering Solutions for Disadvantaged Actors

Developing country WTO Members struggle to make effective use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding system due to a lack of capacity and limited resources. Without the ability to access technical assistance and legal support, these nations are at a disadvantage for successfully pursuing cases [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2><strong>Developing Countries and DSU: Identifying Problems, Offering Solutions for Disadvantaged Actors<br />
</strong></h2>
<p>Developing country WTO Members struggle to make effective use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding system due to a lack of capacity and limited resources. Without the ability to access technical assistance and legal support, these nations are at a disadvantage for successfully pursuing cases under the DSU system and ensuring compliance with DSU rulings. In response, ICTSD has invited dispute settlement and international trade policy expert, <a href="http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jgi049?ijkey=sCtstP41iBTuveY&amp;keytype=ref">Professor Chad P. Bown </a>of Brandeis University and the Brookings Institute to lead a roundtable discussion on the challenges developing countries face within the DSU system and possible solutions for resolving these problems. As part of ICTSD’s Cafe &amp; Croissants series, this event will be an informal, off-the-record, lively dialogue and debate where all professionals interested in this topic are invited to participate.<br />
<strong></strong><strong>WTO Members </strong>have increasingly made use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding system to defend their trade and sustainable development interests since its introduction in the mid-1990s. Yet, developing country Members have struggled to effectively make use of this system. Lack of capacity and resources limits these countries’ ability to access technical assistance and legal support that is needed to successfully identify and pursue DSU cases. In response, ICTSD has organised an informal dialogue event that will examine this problem within the DSU system and offer ways it can be resolved.<br />
The ICTSD-led event, entitled “Post-Doha Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries: Identifying and Addressing the Need for Improved Extra-Legal DSU Support,” will focus on two fundamental problems with the DSU system related to developing countries lack of capacity: first, trade disputes not initiated under the DSU; and second, the unprepared use of the DSU system. Led by Professor Chad P. Bown of Brandeis University and the Brookings Institute in the US, the dialogue will explore these problems ultimately leading to the proposition of solutions including the creation of a WTO institution that will assist developing countries in pursuing WTO enforcement.<br />
The creation and workings of this proposed institute includes identifying where developing countries are making efforts to use DSU and what the outcomes—both successes and failures—of these cases are; working with stakeholders (NGOs, civil society, think tanks and the private sector) to reposition their skill-sets in order to take full advantage of the WTO enforcement system for economic development; and motivating the creation of a new WTO compliance monitoring institution that will bring together a network of available technical assistance that developing countries can access for help in effectively pursuing WTO enforcement.<br />
The upcoming dialogue is part of ICTSD’s Cafe &amp; Croissants series, which are informal, off-the-record dialogues and discussions, where visiting speakers are invited to introduce a timely issue that sits at the intersection of trade and sustainable development. Here, Professor Brown, an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and the International Business School at Brandeis University and a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institute, has been invited to lead the roundtable on the DSU system.<br />
Organised for Wednesday 5 June 2008 in Geneva, Switzerland across from ICTSD’s offices in the International Environment House I, the event is open to all interested parties. ICTSD encourages a broad range of international stakeholders interested in these issues to participate and to engage actively in discussions, thereby enabling fruitful, innovative and lively dialogues to take place. Those interested in attending should contact Sheila Sabune<a href="http://ssabune@ictsd.ch"></a> at <a href="ssabune@ictsd.ch">ssabune@ictsd.ch</a> or Simon Jon Tans at <a href="mailto:stans@ictsd.ch">stans@ictsd.ch</a> or by fax at (+41) 22 917 80 93 to RSVP and for further information. Seating is limited. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/events/dialogues/11396/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Access to Justice in the WTO - the Case for Small Claims&#160;Procedures</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11306/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11306/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 2007 08:36:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Issue paper]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=11306</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The DSU is in principle blind to the commercial stakes involved in a dispute between its Members in that it makes no distinction between a claim of 100,000 dollars and a claim of 100,000,000 dollars. Arguably, a system where the procedures are the same while the stakes differ makes it less attractive for Members to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The DSU is in principle blind to the commercial stakes involved in a dispute between its Members in that it makes no distinction between a claim of 100,000 dollars and a claim of 100,000,000 dollars. Arguably, a system where the procedures are the same while the stakes differ makes it less attractive for Members to engage, especially for smaller trading countries whose trade volumes may not, from their governments&#8217; perspective, merit a full-blown dispute under the current set-up. In this sense, the impartiality in the system impedes less developed countries&#8217; willingness and ability to pursue their trade interests and sustainable development objectives through the existing procedures. Proceeding from a review of the rationale and practices of small claims procedures at the national level, the paper explores whether a similar institution can be adopted at the WTO to offset the disproportionate element of the system.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11306/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Appeal without Remand: A Design Flaw in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement and How To Fix&#160;It</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11301/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11301/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 2007 08:28:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Issue paper]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=11301</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Various reasons have been propounded for the lack of active engagement by the majority of the Membership of the DSU. While many of these constraints need to be addressed at the national level, the current review process of the DSU also offers a potential avenue to improve the functioning of the DSU. The Appellate Body [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Various reasons have been propounded for the lack of active engagement by the majority of the Membership of the DSU. While many of these constraints need to be addressed at the national level, the current review process of the DSU also offers a potential avenue to improve the functioning of the DSU. The Appellate Body does not have the mandate to decide on factual questions, which sometimes means it cannot complete the analysis and resolution of a case. Yet, at the same time, the Appellate Body cannot remand a case back to the original panel, which sometimes forces a complainant to re-file a case. Consequently, in a growing number of disputes the Appellate Body has left parts of or entire cases unresolved. The absence of a remand procedure can force developing country complainants to go through two full proceedings before they achieve a result. Given time and resource constraints, such re-filings subsequent to the Appellate Body finding that it &#8220;cannot complete the analysis&#8221; may simply be excluded as the money and or human resources may simply not be available for a second round of consultations, panel proceedings and Appellate Body hearings. The study examines the origins and extent of this &#8220;design flaw&#8221; and offers possible solutions to alleviate the problem, either through a formal amendment of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and/or practices that do not require DSU amendment.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11301/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Compliance and Remedies Against Non-Compliance in the WTO&#160;System</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11297/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11297/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Jun 2007 08:13:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Issue paper]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=11297</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Enforcement of dispute settlement rulings has been strengthened since the establishment of the WTO; even so, available options for retaliation arguably seem to be geared more towards re-balancing the level of concessions rather than inducing compliance with Member obligations. Moreover, the smaller the economy and the narrower the trade basket, the slimmer the opportunity to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Enforcement of dispute settlement rulings has been strengthened since the establishment of the WTO; even so, available options for retaliation arguably seem to be geared more towards re-balancing the level of concessions rather than inducing compliance with Member obligations. Moreover, the smaller the economy and the narrower the trade basket, the slimmer the opportunity to find a sector to retaliate against without adversely affecting the domestic market. In this context, the present study argues that as long as retaliation is the only remedy, and that the system does not provide adequate opportunity or incentives for disputing parties to agree on meaningful compensation, only larger economies will be in a position to impose &#8216;effective&#8217; retaliation. The study explores ways in which to make Panel and Appellate Body reports more conducive to compliance to advance the position of developing countries by enabling them to retaliate efficiently against a stronger trading partner.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11297/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Developing Countries, Countermeasures and WTO Law: Reinterpreting the DSU against the Background of International&#160;Law</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11294/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11294/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2007 07:58:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[ICTSD Publications]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=11294</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Developing countries maintain that the present World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) enforcement mechanism is structurally incapable of inducing compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body when the losing party is a developed country. Yet the reform proposals set forth by developing countries not only have failed to gather [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Developing countries maintain that the present World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) enforcement mechanism is structurally incapable of inducing compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body when the losing party is a developed country. Yet the reform proposals set forth by developing countries not only have failed to gather the necessary consensus, but they have also met with skepticism in academic circles due to their excessive reliance on enhanced and collective countermeasures as a means to redress the imbalances of the WTO enforcement process, and most of these proposals intersect certain areas of WTO law which still have unsettled or highly controversial interpretations. This paper submits that an interpretation of the present texts against the background of public international law may open up new perspectives which could be very favourable to developing countries. Many of the objectives pursued by developing countries could be achieved by interpreting the relevant provisions of the DSU in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the WTO Agreement &#8216;in their context and in the light of its object and purpose&#8217;, as provided by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/publications/11294/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Institutional Choice in the General System of Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of&#160;Rights</title>
		<link>http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/31725/</link>
		<comments>http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/31725/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Dec 2005 15:53:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Aziz</dc:creator>
		
		<category><![CDATA[Developing Countries and DSU]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Dispute Settlement and Understanding Programme]]></category>

		<category><![CDATA[Systemic Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://ictsd.org/?p=31725</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The WTO case EC-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries involved a challenge by India of special tariff preferences granted by the European Community (EC) to twelve developing countries in order &#8220;to combat drug production and trafficking&#8221; (the Drug Arrangements), resulting in decisions of a judicial panel and the Appellate Body of [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The WTO case EC-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries involved a challenge by India of special tariff preferences granted by the European Community (EC) to twelve developing countries in order &#8220;to combat drug production and trafficking&#8221; (the Drug Arrangements), resulting in decisions of a judicial panel and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO). After providing background to the dispute and examining key ambiguities in the legal texts, we focus on three aspects of the interpretive context that are of broader concern and which have not previously been developed: first, the normative framing and how that frame may elide the larger historical and political contexts of colonialism and asymmetric power in international economic relations (sections II and III); second, the institutional choices faced by the WTO judicial decision-makers when deciding over conditions for preferences, and the implications of these choices for participation in political, judicial and market decision-making (sections IV and V); and third, the potential shaping of judicial interpretation in response to commentary from an interpretive legal community that comes predominately from North America and Europe (section VI). However hyper-technical and brilliantly legalistic our reasoning may be, our interpretation of the ambiguities of the relevant legal texts will inevitably be affected by our backgrounds and normative approaches. Our backgrounds and normative inclinations affect the framing and understanding of a case in which a WTO judicial body exercises significant power.</p>
<p>The WTO case EC-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries involved a challenge by India of special tariff preferences granted by the European Community (EC) to twelve developing countries in order &#8220;to combat drug production and trafficking&#8221; (the Drug Arrangements), resulting in decisions of a judicial panel and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 Underthe Drug Arrangements, the EC granted preferential tariff rates to Pakistan and eleven other countries over and above the EC&#8217;s normal preference system for developing countries, the &#8220;Generalized System of Preferences&#8221; (GSP). The case has significant implications for all conditional grants of trade preferences, including those conditioned on human rights and intellectual property and investment protection. The decision likewise informs multilateral negotiations over &#8220;special and differential&#8221; treatment in the Doha negotiating round regarding the definition of beneficiaries and the content of preferences.4 Much of the academic analysis of this case, however, remains rather a-historic and de-contextualized. This article highlights some of the historical, political, sociological, and institutional contexts in which India&#8217;s GSP claims have been interpreted.</p>
<p>After providing background to the dispute and examining key ambiguities in the legal texts, we focus on three aspects of the interpretive context that are of broader concern and which, in our view, have not previously been developed: first, the normative framing and how that frame may elide the larger historical and political contexts of colonialism and asymmetric power in international economic relations (sections II and III); second, the institutional choices faced by the WTO judicial decision-makers when deciding over conditions for preferences, and the implications of these choices for participation in political, judicial and market decision-making (sections IV and V); and third, the potential shaping of judicial interpretation in response to commentary from an interpretive legal community that comes predominately from North America and Europe (section VI). However hyper-technical and brilliantly legalistic our reasoning may be, our interpretation of the ambiguities of the relevant legal texts will inevitably be affected by our backgrounds and normative approaches. Our backgrounds and normative inclinations affect the framing and understanding of a case in which a WTO judicial body exercises significant power.</p>
<p>The GSP system is arguably not that important for overall imports into the United States and Europe. It is reported that &#8220;only 1.3 percent of U.S. imports in 1999 entered duty-free under the GSP,&#8221;5 and only 3.1 percent of EC imports entered duty-free under the GSP in 1997.6 However, the GSP system remains important for many developing country sectors and it has been politically important in US and European relations with developing countries, where it has been heavily used, in particular, by promoters of enhanced intellectual property and labor rights. Moreover, the GSP case illustrates the centrality of institutional choice in the WTO judiciary&#8217;s handling of the linkage between WTO trade provisions and other policies. Those wholly familiar with the legal texts, the US and European preference systems, and the WTO judicial decisions may wish to skip or skim the next section that we provide as background.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>http://ictsd.org/i/dsu/31725/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

