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WTO
MEMBERS WELCOME AG CHAIR'S PAPER, BUT CRITICISE 'BALANCE'
WTO Members
have welcomed a recent paper seeking to challenge them to work harder
to find common ground beyond their entrenched positions in the deadlocked
Doha Round agriculture talks.
During a six-hour
informal meeting on 7 May, Members from a cross-section of interest
groups expressed their appreciation of the 'challenges' paper prepared
by the chair of the agriculture negotiations, Ambassador Crawford
Falconer (New Zealand) (see BRIDGES
Weekly, 2 May 2007). While welcoming its overall contribution
to the negotiating process, many criticised what they perceived
as specific weaknesses in the paper, arguing that the text was 'imbalanced'.
In later comments
to the press, the chair interpreted this as a positive omen. "Nobody
had a good thing to say about the paper - so I think we're in business!"
he wryly stated. "The paper deliberately kicked just about
as many shins as possible
I was greatly relieved that nobody
said that they welcomed the paper in all its details."
In that sense,
he suggested, the paper had succeeded in its goal of challenging
Members to engage with each other seriously on the outstanding issues
in the talks. "Everybody was doing what I would've expected,"
he said, "which is now, actually, negotiating
. they are
all now trying to tug the blanket firmly to their side of the bed."
Members' comments
had reassured him that his paper had for the most part accurately
identified the range of possible configurations in which consensus
could plausibly be found, he suggested. While negotiators had argued
that agreement should be found at one end or the other of any given
spectrum, few had challenged the choice of the range itself, he
said.
'Balance'
Some delegates'
comments supported his claims. "Everyone, from their own angle,
thinks it's unbalanced" said one: "in that sense, he's
done a good job." Others, however, pointed out that not all
areas received equal criticism: whereas the US claimed that the
paper had not focused enough on improving market access, all other
Members argued that more attention to subsidy cuts was needed instead.
Developing countries also argued that the paper was more cautious
about offending developed country sensitivities than it was about
those of developing countries.
The G-20 group
of developing countries that favour reform of developed country
agriculture pointed out in a statement that "balance will not
be found by averaging negotiating positions". Instead, the
group argued, "balance can only be found by reference to the
mandate and to the outcome in other areas of the negotiations."
Back to Geneva
A statement
from the group of least-developed countries described the chair's
paper as a tool for "re-awakening the hitherto dormant multilateral
process." Developing country delegates in general welcomed
the fact that the text had apparently brought the negotiating process
back to Geneva, after months of fruitless waiting for a breakthrough
from the small-group consultations among the 'G-4' major trading
powers (the EU, US, Brazil and India).
Despite persistent
rumours of progress, no clear results have yet emerged from the
G-4 process, leading other WTO Members to call ever more vociferously
for the talks to be 'multilateralised' again, through the inclusion
of the wider membership. Arguably, the chair's paper may have achieved
this goal, by reinvigorating the negotiating process in Geneva.
While one delegate
suggested that a 1-3 May meeting of the G-4 in London had focused
more on "mapping out differences" than on bridging them,
another trade source familiar with the discussions stated more bluntly
that "there was not a lot of progress
negotiators 'went
over the ground'" rather than identifying a clear way forward.
Indeed, given that the London meeting was intended to be preparatory
to a ministerial gathering from 17-18 May in Paris, "you could
fear a bit for Paris."
At the same
time, to the extent that the G-4 had managed to move closer on some
areas, the chair's paper could have reflected this more clearly,
the source said. Instead of reflecting areas where some consensus
had been reached, and urging progress on others, the paper seemed
at times to be disconnected from the G-4 process.
Members "re-engaged"
At the 7 May
meeting, the chair estimated that over fifty members had made interventions
providing their reaction to his paper. Trade sources indicated that
in most cases delegates simply restated their established positions.
However, Members were "re-engaged," the chair observed
in comments afterwards to the press. His paper had "got the
adrenalin running" again.
While a number
of countries argued that they could not accept the paper as a basis
for negotiations, the chair responded by saying that this was not
the purpose of the text. Rather, it sought to challenge delegates
to respond to concrete options for achieving consensus, with the
aim of identifying possible ways forward.
Market access:
flexibilities remain controversial
The G-33 group
of developing countries, which favours providing developing countries
with substantial flexibility to protect their agricultural 'special
products' (SPs) on the basis of food security, livelihood security
and rural development criteria, argued that the paper was biased
towards developed countries in its treatment of market access. "There
is a clear imbalance between market access for developed countries
and that for developing countries," the group claimed.
It also criticised
the chair's decision to focus on the number of special products
that developing countries would be allowed, to the exclusion of
any discussion of the 'indicators' which are meant to guide their
selection. The group argued instead that negotiators should focus
on both numbers and indicators. Furthermore, the "streamlined
list of indicators" that G-33 ministers had agreed on at their
20-21 March meeting in Jakarta (see BRIDGES
Weekly, 28 March 2007) should form the basis of discussions,
as these had "been supported by the African Group, ACP and
SVEs, and so, almost the entire developing world."
The US - which,
along with other exporting countries, has opposed substantial flexibility
for SPs - argued that "a 'number of lines' filter could be
a useful tool as part of an overall approach that also involves
indicators." Previously, the US has proposed that developing
countries be allowed to designate no more than five tariff lines
as special products.
In separate
comments, one G-33 delegate was critical of the chair's attempt
to interpret the mandated "more flexible treatment" for
special products as meaning that no exemptions would be allowed,
as well as of his suggestion that all such tariff lines be cut by
at least ten to twenty percent. The group's statement argued that
"this is very restrictive compared to various flexibilities
that you have offered on sensitive products as well as domestic
support."
The US also
suggested that countries be permitted higher deviation from the
tariff cut if fewer special products are chosen, longer staging
for SP tariff cuts, and combining smaller tariff cuts with tariff
rate quotas, particularly for products with high tariffs. Other
exporting countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, Costa Rica and
Paraguay expressed their opposition to the G-33's views.
Trade sources
also reported that the G-10 group of countries with highly-protected
agricultural sectors (such as Switzerland, Norway and Japan) expressed
their dissatisfaction with the paper's discussion of sensitive products,
saying that the five percent limit proposed by the chair went beyond
the bounds of what they would be able to accept. The G-33 also argued
that, while Members had agreed to provide special and differential
treatment for developing countries, the paper did not make clear
what this would mean for sensitive products.
Domestic
support: US singled out
A number of
groups and individual Members commented that the paper had been
insufficiently demanding on the 'domestic support' pillar of the
agriculture negotiations, dealing with subsidy cuts. Referring to
the chair's statement that agreement on the cut in overall trade-distorting
domestic support would be found "certainly below 19 [billion
USD] and somewhere above the very low teens," the G-20 argued
that "what should be discarded are the "high teens"
and that the "lower teens" actually reflect the only possible
centre of gravity." The US is currently offering to cut its
maximum permitted total subsidy spending by some 53 percent, to
$22 billion - more than the $19 billion it currently spends, and
well above the G-20's proposal for a 75 percent cut, which would
reduce US spending to around $12 billion.
The G-33 similarly
noted that the chair's paper would mean that overall trade-distorting
support in "one of the major agricultural subsidisers could
remain much higher than the current levels of subsidies."
The US instead
argued that while they recognised the need "to make a further
contribution" in this area, "there are limits as to what
is realistic." The US also argued that the paper failed to
appreciate "the primary importance of the market access pillar
over the export competition and domestic support pillars" -
an argument that was vociferously rejected by other Members such
as the EU, which emphasised the need to strike an equal balance
across all three areas.
The chair sought
to clarify the language in his paper, explaining to Members that
"below $19 billion" meant $18 billion, and the "low
teens" meant double digits (rather than thirteen or above).
He had meant to warn negotiators that calling for the US to cut
subsidy spending to below $10 billion would not be accepted, he
said.
The US also
argued that Members should bear in mind that the amber box caps
and blue box disciplines discussed in the chair's paper are "not
intended to be additional cuts". In contrast, the G-20 emphasised
that "at lower levels of cuts, disciplines become ever more
essential". Many developing countries are concerned that any
new agreement is effective in preventing developed country subsidisers
from maintaining high levels of support on specific products by
simply shifting support programmes between different WTO categories,
in the absence of any substantive reform of these programmes' effects
on trade or production.
Export competition
At the meeting,
the EU repeated its demands for parallel treatment of the different
elements within the export competition pillar. WTO Members agreed
in 2005 to phase out export subsidies by 2013, which the EU accepted
on the condition that similar forms of export competition (such
as export credits, or US food aid) be disciplined as well.
Trade sources
indicated that the EU may seek to extend the 2013 deadline, now
that the deadline for concluding the Doha negotiations has been
delayed. The chair's paper nonetheless assumes that the 2013 date
remains valid, and that the implementation period must be shortened
as a result.
The US welcomed
some of the chair's suggestions on food aid - such as the idea that
organisations other than the WTO should define what constitutes
an emergency situation. US food aid has been criticised by other
Members such as the EU, who argue that it often constitutes a form
of disguised export subsidy. The US nonetheless opposed the notion
that Members should move towards providing cash-based aid, rather
than providing in-kind donations. A statement by the least-developed
countries emphasised that such aid should be in fully grant form.
Cotton
Cotton-producing
countries welcomed the chair's text, suggesting that it had successfully
achieved its goal of provoking reactions. Whilst indicating that
the US reaction did not contain any great surprises, they noted
the need for a systemic solution to the sector's problems, and welcomed
the support they received from other country groupings in the 7
May meeting.
'Radical
thought'
Delegations
reacted cautiously to the chair's "radical" proposal for
developing countries to "drop the complicated flexibilities
and just go for a straight overall average cut," comparable
to that which applied in the previous Uruguay Round of world trade
negotiations. The G-20 indicated that they would examine the proposal's
implications "and react at a later stage."
The Chinese
delegation was more forthright in response to the idea, stating
simply that they "don't believe it would help the negotiation."
One trade source
confided that "people are sceptical. Many don't think it's
viable at this stage." A simple average tariff cut was not
necessarily seen as being better for developing countries, the source
said.
Intensive
consultations
The chair told
Members that he would be bringing out a 'second instalment' of the
paper on 14 May, covering various issues he had not addressed in
his first paper. The paper had not included specific comments on
special treatment for recently-acceded Members or for small and
vulnerable economies; on Green Box subsidies; on the special safeguard
mechanism that developing countries could use to defend themselves
against import surges; on tropical product liberalisation and preference
erosion, commodities, and a number of other issues.
Falconer also
said that he intends to launch intensive 'Room F' consultations
with small groups of invited negotiators, in the fortnight beginning
21 May.
Trade sources
indicated that they expected to have a revised 'modalities' text
by mid-June, setting out formulas and figures for tariff and subsidy
cuts, and exceptions to them. This would provide time for discussion
of the text before the WTO's customary summer break in August, which
in turn could allow the Doha round to be concluded by the year end.
Trade sources nonetheless cautioned that the US timeframe may be
different, with negotiating stances dictated as much by domestic
discussions as by the need for agreement by July.
ICTSD reporting.
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