Trade Policy Options for Enhancing Food Aid Effectiveness: Revisiting the Draft Doha Deal

By Edward Clay

Introduction

The Bali Agreement of December 2013 (WTO 2013), the first substantive international trade policy deal since the Doha Development Round (DDR) became deadlocked in 2008, envisages a full review of the DDR text during 2014. Therefore, the present moment provides an opportunity to re-examine the draft text on international food aid (WTO 2008) that was apparently close to being accepted in December 2008. The text also reflects an exceptionally wide and intense debate with the repeated redrafting to reflect the priorities and concerns of WTO Members, not just donors and major food exporters but also least developed and African countries.

This paper extends the analysis of the previous study Clay (2012), first to review evidence of more recent trends in food aid since the food price spike of 2007–8, including both established and emerging donors and possible implications. Second, it considers institutional developments, in particular the Food Assistance Convention of 2012 (FAC 2012) and early evidence on how it operates. As the US continues to be the major food aid donor, accounting for more than half of reported expenditure and volumes delivered, the 2014 US Agriculture Act or Farm Bill (United States 2014) is also likely to provide a key part of the framework for international food aid for the remainder of the decade. The food security policies of developed and developing country are also evolving quite rapidly subsequent to the 2007–08 price spike. There are also attempts to find ways of making commitments to avoid export restrictions that hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. The paper concludes with some suggested policy implications of recent food insecurity episodes and developments in food aid. The paper is set in the context that the DDR draft text of December 2008 may become the basis for furthering negotiations and, as such, attempts to relate developments to the text, its wording and the issues it seeks to address.

In revisiting the DDR draft, it is useful to begin by clarifying definitions and clearly restating principles before looking forward to what might be agreed, keeping in mind the issues of the proportionality and the practicalities of proposed disciplines in relation to the risks of unfair export competition and ensuring the effectiveness of food aid.

1 The helpful comments and suggestions of Panos Konandreas and George Simon, as well as those of participants in an ICTSD "Dialogue on food aid in the post-Bali context" held in Geneva on 4 June 2014, are gratefully acknowledged, but responsibility is solely that of the author.

2 Chapter 6, "Food aid at the WTO" of Jennifer Clapp's Hunger in the Balance (2012) provides a considered account of the lengthy and negotiation process that led to the proposed food aid disciplines included as Annex L of the 2008 Draft AoA. See also Clay 2006.
1. Changing ideas of what food aid is

The issue of definitions is critical to understanding the changing focus in current international policy discussions and the implications for drafting future international trade and aid agreements. Food aid is widely used in a quite a flexible way to include domestic food-based interventions by governments and civil society, as well as support for such interventions by international agencies, aid donors and non-governmental organizations. The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) of 1994 (Box 1) and the draft Doha text both refer specifically to:

\[\text{International food aid} \text{ "both in-kind and cash-based food aid donations" that involve the importation of food or aid-funded acquisition on the local market (draft AoA).}\]

In contrast, the World Food Programme (WFP) and some donors, notably the USA, as well as the Food Assistance Convention of 2012 (FAC 2012) which replaces the 1999 Food Aid Convention, have recently begun to employ a wider definition:

\[\text{(International) Food Assistance: interventions (that are aid-funded) to improve food security or nutritional status involving the direct distribution of food or transfers in cash, tokens, inputs, tools, etc.}\\]

The WFP Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS\(^3\)), which has primary responsibility for the collection, the statistical collation and the dissemination of information on food aid actions, continues to employ working definitions approximately equivalent to the forms of food aid in the WTO texts, with implications for trade and markets (Box 2). The analyses in this paper employ these definitions. However, as some donors are no longer reporting international food aid separately, but as part of food assistance, for example as FAC 2012 Commitments or as humanitarian assistance within their official

---

\(^3\) See [http://www.wfp.org/fais](http://www.wfp.org/fais).
development assistance (ODA) commitments reported to the OECD, it is becoming more difficult to isolate food aid from broader categories of aid.

Box 2: Forms of food aid: WFP definitions and equivalent WTO definitions

Categories of use

Emergency food aid (WTO and WFP): freely distributed, grants.

Non-emergency food aid (WTO) includes:

- Project food aid (WFP): distributed or sold (monetized); channelled multilaterally, bilaterally or through NGOs, grants.
- Programme food aid (WFP): bilateral, sold (monetized), grant or loan.

Delivery modes

Cash-based Aid (WTO) includes:

- Local purchases procured in the aid-recipient country.
- Triangular purchases including Regional Purchases procured on the international market or by restricted purchase in another developing country.

Export competition is a core DDR issue, and the December 2008 draft text\(^4\) includes fully elaborated disciplines for international food aid based on two principles: (a) minimizing trade displacement risks; and (b) ensuring that disciplines do not hamper adequate and timely levels of humanitarian assistance as emergency aid. Taking the 1994 AoA as a starting point, the proposed disciplines include the following key elements. International food aid is to be on a fully grant basis and thereby clearly distinguished from any forms of loan or agricultural export credit. A Safe Box for Emergency Food Aid is to include all case-based (untied) aid and bone fide in-kind emergency aid with a detailed set of procedures for determining the genuineness of an emergency action. Disciplines are envisaged for non-emergency aid in-kind to minimize risks of trade displacement, especially where monetization is involved.

Although the draft text is "bracket free", there are possible grey areas. For example, restricted purchase in another developing country is partially untied aid according to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definitions, which an excluded exporter could argue to be a form of competition. If, as discussed below, international food aid is now a relatively modest part of ODA, non-emergency aid a small proportion of the total and a marginal share of imports by Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs), one could argue that the disciplines are disproportionate to the potential risks.

\(^4\) See WTO 2008.
of trade displacement and too complex to be practical. These important questions regarding the continuing relevance of the draft text are reconsidered in the light of more recent developments.

2. Food aid since the 2007–08 food price spike: trends

Presently, food aid is a marginal aid resource, representing approximately 3 per cent of DAC donor official development assistance, but 18 per cent of humanitarian assistance. Food aid has declined in absolute scale and seems likely to either fluctuate around current levels of around 5 million tons, perhaps 80 to 90 per cent as cereals, or even decline further. Global food security implications are also modest: under 8 per cent of LDC cereal imports and under 0.5 per cent of NFIDC imports. However, food aid can be highly significant for very food-insecure countries and regions in crisis, as is currently the case for the Ethiopian and the Syria-related humanitarian crises. This relative unimportance is reflected in the often quite modest administrative arrangements of most DAC donors for managing food aid, typically as part of humanitarian assistance.5

Food aid has always been procyclical – least available when most needed – with rising global prices (Clay 2012: Figure 2). This unsatisfactory reality reflects a combination of factors: the common budgetary practice of making forward allocations in financial terms so that rising prices erode the value of aid; and also because in some cases additional resources become available, for example to manage overhanging stocks in a weak market. The Food Aid Conventions from 1967 onwards were intended to provide some stability as the donors committed themselves to minimum levels in commodity terms, but they only met with partial success. Some donors programmed aid at well above minimum commitment levels when markets were soft and voluntary commitments were either temporarily set aside or permanently reduced in tight market conditions (Clay 2010; Hoddinott et al. 2007). Commitments to WFP, now overwhelming for humanitarian assistance, are made partially on an ad hoc basis in response to crisis appeals.6

Unsurprisingly, actual levels fell away as cereal prices rose, reaching a peak in 2007–08. However, since 2008, somewhat lower international food prices have not been associated with a bounce back in food aid levels. Instead, total aid measured in terms of physical deliveries has a downward trend from the recent peak of 14.6 million tons in 1999 to only 4.8 million tons in 2011, the lowest level since the 1973 global crisis, recovering to 5.0 million tons in 2012.

5 The US is exceptional as both US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) are involved budgetarily and organisationally.

6 Government Donor Commitments for 2013 were almost USD 4.1 billion, but, as of 13 April 2014, they only amounted to just under USD 1.8 billion for 2014 and USD 208 million for 2015.
The failure of food aid volumes to bounce back cannot be explained purely in terms of sensitivity to international food prices (Figure 1). Informal soundings suggest a combination of factors. First, almost all donors have abandoned bilateral food aid for budgetary or balance-of-payments support.\(^7\) Second, some donors (e.g. the EU, Netherlands, Norway and the UK) explicitly prefer increasingly to fund other forms of humanitarian aid and support for food security: cash-based transfers, non-food assistance to recovery and finance for food security projects, instead of supporting food for direct distribution.\(^8\) The untying of aid more broadly associated with the OECD DAC 2001 Recommendation on Untying Aid has facilitated the untying of funding to allow cash-based food aid as well as the more flexible use of budget lines previously earmarked for food aid (OECD 2009). Third, the combination of fiscal austerity as reflected in the overall aid levels, more generally for DAC Members, and of food having to be provided as a full cost resource, in the absence of surpluses for disposal, has depressed food aid levels. Fourth, the commodity composition of food aid is changing, with a reduced share of wheat and dairy products sourced from temperate zone countries and a growing share of coarse grains locally and regionally sourced in Africa, as well as foods processed for nutritional goals.

Non-traditional donors are collectively increasing their food aid; however, individually, they are unpredictable. Middle Eastern oil exporters – Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and UEA – are typically making discrete and sharply fluctuating annual contributions through WFP. Other emerging economies are to date most likely to provide tied aid in-kind, as discussed below.

---

7 Presently, Japan is the main exception, providing rice as programme food aid, as discussed below (Table 2).

8 The WFP’s annual report for 2013 suggest that about a quarter of its expenditure, which has averaged some USD 4 billion during 2009–13, is now in forms of food assistance other than food aid; a broadly consistent estimate is provided by Cash Atlas (https://www.cash-atlas.org), established to monitor food assistance in the form of cash, which states that some USD 1.1 billion is directly provided globally in the form of vouchers or as cash in 2013. There is an urgent need to strengthen the monitoring of food assistance broadly defined.
These developments have been reflected in the modes of use and sourcing of food aid since the beginning of the DDR negotiations in 2001. Aid in-kind (direct transfers) has declined in absolute and relative terms, and programme aid is reduced to negligible levels (Figure 1). In contrast, emergency aid levels have fluctuated in response to crises but have followed a less sharp declining trend than non-emergency food aid. Cash-based aid (local purchases and triangular transactions) has increased in absolute and relative importance (Figure 2) and is associated with the progressive and, in some cases, complete untying of aid by most DAC donors (Clay 2012). However, there was an apparent reversal of these trends in 2011 and 2012, with aid in-kind levels rising and cash-based aid falling, which sharply underscores the uncertainty that continues to surround food aid.

Figure 2: Global food aid: total deliveries, local and triangular purchases (cash-based aid) and emergency uses 2000–10 (tons)

3. Food aid governance is fragmented and changing

The text on trade issues and food aid will have to take into account the fragmented, complex and changing governance. Key elements are now as follows. The WTO Committee on Agriculture supervises the 1994 AoA, the text of which explicitly refers to responsibility for defining when loans qualify as aid and issues determining if there is trade displacement to other places (Box 1). However, an examination of this text indicates that these linkages require reframing or replacing. The last Food Aid Convention of 1999, which lapsed in June 2012, was replaced by the Food Assistance Convention 2012 and the Committee of Signatories. Presently, the OECD DAC provides the only widely accepted definition of whether loans qualify as ODA. However food aid is excluded from the DAC 2001 Recommendation on Untying of Aid to LDCs and other OECD voluntary agreements on export credits.

The Principles and Rules on Surplus Disposal are administered by the Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSD) of the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems, which has not reported since

Source: WFP INTERFAIS
However, food aid is presently effectively excluded from the remit of the Committee on Global Food Security located in the FAO. The WFP Executive Board with 30 representative countries is supervising the agency’s budget and activities of USD 4 billion and more than half of international food aid. The draft text will have to be re-examined in the light of this changing wider governance structure and to see if scope exists for simplification of the modalities, especially regarding emergency aid.

After several years of difficult negotiation a new Food Assistance Convention was unanimously agreed by signatories in 2012 to replace the lapsed 1999 Food Aid Convention, the last of a sequence of treaties making commitments of international food aid since 1967. The FAC 2012 widens member commitments from “food aid” tonnages (1967–99) to include: food to distribute or sell, cash-for-food, tokens, seeds, inputs and tools. Minimum Commitments are to be made in cash or physical terms on an annual basis instead of for the duration of the agreement. In removing a fixed floor on commitments, the FAC 2012 no longer explicitly attempts to counteract the procyclical potential of food aid. The Convention allows up to 20% of commitments as loans, apparently backtracking from the DDR draft, although the text explicitly states that the treaty in no way pre-empts decisions by the WTO.

### Table 1: Food assistance convention 2012: Donor commitments for 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitment in National Currency:</th>
<th>USD Equivalent (mn)*</th>
<th>Estimated Grain Equivalent 000 tons*</th>
<th>Per cent of Total*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>€1.495mn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CD250mn</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DKK185mn</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>€300mn</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>€6mn</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>JPY10bn</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>USD15mn</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>CHF34mn</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>USD1.6bn</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>2286</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,430</strong></td>
<td><strong>3475</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Food Assistance Convention (IGC) on National Currency commitments

* Author’s estimates based on FAC reported commitments in national currencies.

---

9 The Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal was established by the Committee on Commodity Problems (CCP) at its Twenty-third Session (1954) to monitor international shipments of surplus agricultural commodities used as food aid in order to minimize the harmful effects of these shipments on commercial trade and agricultural production. The CSD meets in Washington, D.C. (see Konandreas, forthcoming.)

10 The Board is, within the framework of these General Regulations, responsible for providing intergovernmental support and specific policy direction to and supervision of the activities of WFP in accordance with the overall policy guidance of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the FAO Conference, the Economic and Social Council and the Council of FAO, and for ensuring that WFP is responsive to the needs and priorities of recipient countries.
The actions of actual and the many potential members suggest that the usefulness of the new FAC is still to be demonstrated (Clay 2012a). Only nine governments have made annual commitments for 2014, including Russia, which also joined the original eight in 2014 (Table 1). Total commitments, all in national currencies, are equivalent to some USD 2.4 billion, which compares with annual commitments to WFP of around USD 4 billion since 2009. Comparisons are difficult, but if all assistance were to be in the form of procuring and shipping commodity aid, then commitments for 2014 are equivalent to less than 64 per cent of quantitative commitments under the 1999 Convention. The major commitment by the US, standing at almost two thirds of the total, is also equivalent to the 2014 USAID budget for emergency and project food aid, which will be more than 90 per cent in-kind aid. Some signatories, notably the EU, are committed to funding a wider basket of assistance through their committed funding. So far, the majority of DAC donors and other G20 Members have failed to ratify or make commitments under the new FAC, including, for example, Australia, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, which were responsible for 26% of commitments to WFP in 2013.11

4. Trade distortion: is the tide turning?

The sharp decline in food aid levels, the increasing use of untied cash and the multilateral channelling for emergencies would imply reduced trade distortion risks. However, the short term reversal of these trends in 2011–12 to untied aid and emergency uses (Figures 1 and 2), along with some other developments, raises, as Jennifer Clapp suggests (Clapp 2014), the possibility that the tide is turning. Since 2006, US administrations have sought to untie at least part of the food assistance budget. However, such proposals were narrowly defeated and the US Farm Bill 2014 retains tying requirements, monetization and surplus disposal instruments, even if the latter are presently unused (Clay 2014). The FAC 2012 allows monetization and permits up to 20 per cent of commitments to be loans. Finally, the BRICs and other emerging donors – oil exporters excepted – are typically providing tied aid-in-kind. The character of the potential trade displacement issue is suggested in considering actual food aid flows at a commodity level for rice, which is currently one of the three most important forms along with wheat and maize.

11 There is currently a lack of clarity regarding which countries have ratified and are active as signatories of the 2012 FAC. The FAC website (http://foodassistanceconvention.org/en/about_fac/parties.aspx) states that the Food Assistance Convention was adopted on 25 April 2012 in London and that, in accordance with article 12, the Convention was open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York until 31 December 2012, by 35 countries, including all EU member states, the EU and other signatories to the previous 1999 Convention. However, many of these countries appear not to have signed and formally ratified the Convention, and so far only eight of these parties made commitments under the Convention in 2013, with the addition of one new party, Russia, in 2014 (Table 1).
5. Non-emergency aid: are disciplines still appropriate?

The DDR draft envisages disciplines on non-emergency food aid, particularly monetization, because of potential trade displacement risks. Those who oppose disciplines, commonly use the argument of proportionality, that the volumes of aid in-kind or for monetization are additional aid and typically marginal in relation to the overall levels of imports. A limit of 10 per cent of the imports in to a recipient country is sometimes suggested; below this, such effects are supposedly unimportant when set against the potential benefits of additional well-designed NGO projects supporting food security and poverty reduction (Informa 2012).

There is a *disaggregation fallacy* inherent in these arguments and also in current approaches to assessing the potential trade displacement effects of in-kind food. The approach adopted in the Principles and Rules on Surplus Disposal administered by the CSD involves a marginal analysis of individual bilateral programme aid transactions – the amount of food in-kind to be shipped from donor exporters to a single recipient country in relation to the UMRs or the average import levels of that country over several years. Similarly, the approach followed for example by USAID for assessing the disruption effects of monetization on the local market involves a marginal analysis by the operational agency of individual transactions, examining the market disruption potential of monetization by looking at evidence from local markets (Informa 2012). Even if such marginal effects were in practice quantifiable, this approach is fundamentally flawed, because there is no provision for a parallel assessment of the macro or aggregated global trade implications of donor monetization practices.

The problem is highlighted when looking at rice food aid in 2012, a year in which markets were overhung by expanding stock levels in countries such as Indonesia, India and Thailand. Some 800,000 tons of rice food aid were funded, including some 555,000 tons (70 per cent) as in-kind

---

**Table 2: Rice food aid by donor and mode of delivery 2012 (tons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>In-kind Aid (tons)</th>
<th>Cash-based Aid (tons)</th>
<th>Total (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Transfer</td>
<td>Local Purchase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Triangular Transfer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>191,653</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>191,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>173,022</td>
<td>15,442</td>
<td>188,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>139,460</td>
<td>9,544</td>
<td>148,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>526,968</td>
<td>25,119</td>
<td>552,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sub-total</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others (28 countries)</td>
<td>28,940</td>
<td>132,221</td>
<td>161,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Sub-total</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (All)</td>
<td>555,909</td>
<td>157,340</td>
<td>800,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Total</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.wfp.org/fais
food aid (Table 2). Total rice aid rose by 39 per cent and in-kind aid by 79 per cent from 2011 levels. The three largest in-kind donors, Brazil, Japan and the USA, each made many mostly small in-kind donations, respectively to 31, 12 and 24 countries, but together amounting in total to over half a million tons. Almost all rice food aid is of a lower grade, potentially competing with the commercial exports of countries such as Thailand and Vietnam to NFIDCs. The CSD is “dormant”, having not reported food aid transactions since 2009–10; however, most of the above noted transactions for rice would not have been reported under the existing rules as they are too small and/or provided as emergency or development project support (Konandreas 2014). What is missing from the current arrangements and the draft DDR text is a proposal for institutionalizing a global market-wide analysis of the trade-displacing risks of in-kind aid.

**Conclusion**

A new policy environment for international food aid or food assistance is emerging as developed and developing countries continue to reformulate the post global crisis food security agenda. Uncertainty about markets and prices has replaced a complacency associated with the secular downward trend in agricultural commodity prices and the liberalization of global markets. Is the global food economy now in an era of extreme volatility and higher prices? The lack of consensus on these questions underscores uncertainties about fundamentals and how governments will react to volatility. If there are large transitory surpluses and weak markets, will food aid once again become a vent for surpluses for some countries that are actively managing domestic production? If there are high, rising prices on tight markets, the well-documented 2007–08 spike suggests that many governments will restrict exports in order to protect domestic consumption. Unanticipated, isolated events or covariate regional shocks could trigger such measures, hampering humanitarian assistance, which increasingly relies upon the local and regional sourcing of food.

More recent trends and institutional developments add increasing support to the provisional conclusions of the 2012 report and Konandreas (2011) that food aid is unable to manage acute food insecurity risks. First, current levels of food aid, around 5 million tonnes of commodities, and the new FAC commitments in cash and kind, which are equivalent to less than two thirds of that volume of commodity aid (Table 1), scarcely assure responses to idiosyncratic risks – e.g. the Haiti quake, the conflict in Syria and the chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia. Second, an El Niño of uncertain intensity and duration is forecast for late 2014–15, so the international community and potentially vulnerable countries should be considering the implications for responding to covariate risks, such as a Southern African Drought, should adequate food-based resources no longer being assured. Thirdly, likely resource levels preclude, just as in 2007–08, food aid being a major part of the response to systemic risk.

This paper, in updating and broadly confirming the conclusions of the earlier 2012 study, leads to some tentative recommendations for the trade-related governance of food aid and other related actions by the international community.
A. Strengthen risk transfer arrangements to ensure minimum levels of humanitarian assistance.

- A simplified DDR Safe Box may be appropriate to avoid impeding urgent humanitarian assistance. The disciplines should also at least implicitly accept the reality that donor-export and recipient-importing country can together circumnavigate almost any set of rules;

- If the 2012 FAC proves not to be fit for purpose, then is a broader based agreement needed to assure humanitarian resources, including cash and non-food items, to WFP and other international agencies, including the ICRC and NGOs?;

- Enhanced international financial arrangements for providing sovereign risk assurance may be more appropriate than specifically food-related support for national crisis responses.

B. Proportionality and practicality are required in disciplines for minimizing trade distortion risks

- A balance between facilitating national food security, especially for LDCs, while avoiding export restrictions on humanitarian aid must be found. The WTO, along with overlapping bodies such as the G20, should persist with efforts to agree upon voluntary principles with regular peer review to avoid restriction on humanitarian aid.

- Recognizing the need to minimize the risks of food aid becoming a vehicle for transitory surplus management implies that the DDR draft disciplines (Annex L)\(^\text{12}\) are still relevant as a key building block for the future governance of international food aid. The ways in which monitoring and reporting, combined with peer reviewing, are institutionalized could foster good practice and offer ways to reduce the fragmented governance.

---

\(^{12}\) See WTO 2008.
References


